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Abstract
Contemporary intensive care unit (ICU) medicine has complicated
the issue of what constitutes death in a life support environment.
Not only is the distinction between sapient life and prolongation of
vital signs blurred but the concept of death itself has been made
more complex. The demand for organs to facilitate transplantation
promotes a strong incentive to define clinical death in a manner
that most effectively supplies that demand. We consider the
problem of defining death in the ICU as a function of viable organ
availability for transplantation
The scenario
A 45 year old female patient arrives in the emergency
department after having complained of a headache and
progresses to unresponsiveness. She is placed on
mechanical ventilation and a CAT scan of her brain shows
massive intracranial bleed. The family is assured she will
probably progress to brain death but she doesn’t. After two
days in the intensive care unit she continues with gasping
ventilations and some flexion to pain in one arm. All other
brain functions are absent. Her hemodynamics and other
organ function are stable. The family desires the patient to be
an organ donor but she is clearly not brain dead. It is
suggested to the family that the patient can still donate under
the ‘Donation after Cardiac Death’ (DCD) rules. Life support
can be withdrawn and she can be pronounced dead using
asystole as a criterion rather than brain death, following which
organs can be taken for transplantation after a variable period
of time to rule out ‘auto-resuscitation’. Would you recommend
this procedure?
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Patients cannot donate organs until they are dead
Leslie Whetstine
The question that arises from this case is: Is the DCD donor
truly dead at the moment of organ recovery? The answer
depends on two things: first, on what concept of death we are
using; and second, what version of irreversibility we find most
compelling. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to examine
the appropriate conceptual definition of death, but suffice to
say that the traditional concept of death is the irreversible
cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as a
whole. I will argue that DCD does not fulfil this definition.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) [1]
established that death could be declared by either the
irreversible cessation of circulatory functions or the irreversible
cessation of the entire brain, including the brain stem [2].
DCD advocates cite this statute as evidence that DCD is a
legitimate practice using the circulatory criterion. The UDDA
may appear to support DCD but only if we construe a
bifurcated rather than a unitary definition of death that does
not require the permanent cessation of the organism as a
whole but only of certain parts of it. The UDDA claimed it did
not suggest two different types of death but that either of the
two criteria were necessary and sufficient conditions for death.
We cannot embark on a critical analysis of this legislation here
but it has three primary shortcomings: First, it failed to define
the critical term ‘irreversible’; second, irreversible absence of
circulation is sufficient for death but not necessary; and third,
irreversible absence of circulation may be a mechanism of
death, but it is not death itself, which has always been
regarded as brain death. As quoted from the New England
Journal of Medicine [3], “It is clear that a person is not dead
until his brain is dead. The time honoured criteria of the
stoppage of the heart beat and circulation are indicative of
death only when they persist long enough for the brain to die.”
Advocates of DCD take a soft-line interpretation of
irreversibility. They argue that if resuscitation has been539
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proscribed and if the person cannot spontaneously
resuscitate (auto-resuscitation), the person is irreversibly
dead as a practical matter. But a moral decision to not
restore function does not ensure the clinical state of death
has been fulfilled. Moreover, inability to auto-resuscitate
cannot be used to determine when death has occurred as
many people who cannot auto-resuscitate can be
resuscitated with an intervention. Finally, the time period in
which auto-resuscitation may occur has not been sufficiently
studied to make a determination that two or five minutes of
asystole will preclude it. The fact that a person proscribes
resuscitation or cannot auto-resuscitate does not make one
dead at that precise moment, but prognosticates death and
suggests one has entered a dying process that may ultimately
lead to irreversible death.
Organ donation operates under the dead donor rule (DDR),
which stipulates that organs may not be removed prior to death
nor may organ procurement cause or hasten death. DCD fails
to satisfy the DDR on three counts: First, it manipulates the
definition of irreversibility based on a moral position not to
resuscitate; second, it appeals to fallacious logic that because
one cannot auto-resuscitate then one is dead; and third, it
focuses solely on the circulatory criterion endorsed by the
UDDA, which does not immediately correlate with brain status.
Generally speaking, using the circulatory criterion would not be
problematic as its absence will inevitably cause total brain
failure. In DCD, however, the need for speed becomes a factor
such that organs will be removed before the requisite time it
takes for the brain to die as cessation of cardio-respiratory
functions does not cause the brain to die immediately.
If the body can be resuscitated, we have to question if it was
ever really dead given our conventional notion of death as a
finality from which one cannot be returned or resurrected
from under any circumstances. DCD protocols remove
organs from a donor who is not irreversibly dead; if the whole
brain is not yet dead, the patient cannot be dead.
Donation after cardiac death is consistent with good medical practice
Stephan Streat
The issue of how death is certified, if this is ‘according to
good medical practice’, does not determine my approach to
organ donation. Whetstine, however, finds this “the question”
for non-heart-beating donation and advances three
arguments why this should be so. First, I am unconvinced that
death hasn’t occurred because ‘irreversibility’ hasn’t been
established. Strictly speaking, no prospective definition of
‘irreversibility’ is possible. Only after all possible reversal
strategies have failed can a situation truly be said to have
been, in retrospect, ‘irreversible’. In the circumstance of
possible non-heart-beating donation, such strategies would
be morally repugnant and contrary to acceptable clinical
practice. I agree with Cole [4] that inclusion of the concept of
‘irreversibility’ is a deficiency of the Uniform Determination of
Death Act (UDDA) [1]. But this semantic difficulty does not
arise in many countries, including my own, that do not have a
statutory definition of death.
Second, I understand how Whetstine’s concern with
‘irreversibility’ has led her to consider the concept of auto-
resuscitation but the UDDA is silent on this concept, as it is
on the means by which death should be determined,
requiring only that it must be “in accordance with accepted
medical standards” [1]. Although “lack of auto-resuscitation
after a certain time interval” might be a reasonable “accepted
medical standard”, there is no general consensus on whether
this is an appropriate operational approach to “irreversibility”
or on what that “certain time interval” might be and a dearth
of reported evidence to inform that discussion.
The phenomenon of return of spontaneous circulation
(ROSC) after discontinuation of cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion (CPR) was first reported in 1982 [5] and later termed the
‘Lazarus phenomenon’ [6]. A more recent review of 25
reported cases found that the exact timing after stopping
CPR until the detection of ROSC was usually uncertain but
could have been as long as 20 minutes in one case [7].
These authors suggested, “after cessation of CPR, each
patient should be further monitored (at least clinically and
with an ECG) for at least 10 minutes (the typical time interval
for a Lazarus phenomenon).” However, the phenomenology
of similar events after circulatory arrest following extubation in
the presence of severe brain damage may or may not be the
same as those occurring after discontinuation of CPR (which
has usually included, for example, several doses of adrenaline
and other therapies).
In most jurisdictions where non-heart-beating organ donation
occurs, a 10 minute period of circulatory arrest (asystole on
ECG and no pulsatility by arterial line) has been accepted as
sufficient to determine that “death has occurred” [8], whereas
the US Institute of Medicine recommended that a five minute
period was sufficient [9]. Dutch law requires a further five
minute ‘no touch’ period after death has been declared
before any measures to procure organs can begin, similar to
recommendations by the US Institute of Medicine.
Finally, Whetstine suggests that non-heart-beating donation
springs solely from the circulatory criterion endorsed by the
UDDA and, because the cessation of circulation does not
cause the brain to die immediately, that the brain, and thereby
the patient, might still be alive at the time that organ
procurement begins. Although I agree that some parts of the
previously severely damaged brain might be able to function if540
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oxygen transport was immediately restored (even after
perhaps 10 minutes of circulatory arrest), I see this concern
as similar to her concern with irreversibility of circulatory
arrest. There is no way to tell if the brain is dead after such a
period of circulatory arrest, other than by restoring and
maintaining oxygen transport and determining whether any
signs of brain activity return. Such an operational approach to
‘brain death’ is not required by the UDDA or good clinical
practice.
My own concerns in non-heart-beating organ donation are for
the medical acceptability of the methods used to certify death,
the independence of this process from the organ retrieval
process, the manner in which the option of organ donation is
discussed with the family and the acceptability of all of these
processes to everyone involved. I do not believe that organ
donation should ever be ‘recommended’ to families, only that
under appropriate clinical circumstances, perhaps including
this one, it is an ‘option’ that should be ‘sensitively offered’.
A thoughtful analysis of death in the ICU
Mike Darwin
death \’deth\ n 1: 
a permanent cessation of all vital functions: the end of life
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary
The fundamental questions are, simply, what and when is
death? This problem is not new: In the seventh century,
Celsus wrote, “Democritus, a man of well merited celebrity,
has asserted that there are in reality, no characteristics of
death sufficiently certain for physicians to rely upon” [10].
Both Streat and Whetstine essentially concede defeat in
dealing with these two pivotal questions in the first paragraph
of their respective analyses. While sidestepping the core
issue of what is the “appropriate conceptual definition of
death”, Whetstine then argues compellingly that DCD does
not meet either the intent or the criteria set forth in the UDDA.
Streat argues compellingly that the issue of irreversibility is a
practical impossibility to determine, and that because of this,
utilitarian criteria should prevail in determining when death is
pronounced and when organs may be retrieved.
The earliest definitions of death are arguably religious and
largely binary; a person is either clearly dead or alive on the
basis of whether a metaphysical spirit, soul, or life force
continues to animate the physical body. The departure of the
soul is synonymous with unequivocal death of the person and
the only obligations that remain are ritually appropriate corpse
disposal. This worldview is extremely valuable as it satisfies
the practical and emotional needs of people for certainty,
closure and clarity. With the advent of CPR and life support
systems, the formerly binary status of life and death became
increasingly analogue. The advent of transplantation served
only to further degrade the binary view of death by allowing
the continued ‘survival’ of the organism in a fragmented way
in the bodies of others.
Because all other functions of human life could be medically
enabled to persist after the loss of personal identity, the
Harvard Committee properly focused its attention on the sole
organ that enables or produces this property; the brain. As
both Streat and Whetstine agree, however, the problem of
what constitutes ‘irreversible’ was left unaddressed, and this
is a critical flaw in any absolute definition of death. It is
obvious that a solid majority of patients dying today could be
resuscitated and supported artificially with intact mentation,
albeit only at tremendous cost, both in terms of resources
and suffering.
The brain is a discrete pattern of atoms, each as effective as
the next as long as the unique pattern of their arrangement
persists. Presumably all of the attributes of personhood are
encoded in this lattice. This view allows us to view the person
as ‘information beings’, defined by the arrangement of
particular atoms that comprise our brains at any moment. So
long as that pattern of information can be recovered, the
person is not dead. If a cookbook is ripped to pieces it is no
longer functional; it is impossible to read or use. The torn
pages still contain all the information required, however, to
allow for the book to be pieced back together and restored to
a functional, useful state. By contrast, if the book is burned
and the ashes stirred, the loss is irreversible given our current
understanding of physical law (the limitations imposed by
both the laws of thermodynamics and information theory).
This approach to defining death, which is rooted not in
relative, changing technology and vitalistic worldviews, but
rather in the fundamentals of physical law, is known as the
information theoretic criterion of death [11].
As Merkle [11] has stated:
“A person is dead according to the information
theoretic criterion if their memories, personality,
hopes, dreams, etc. have been destroyed in the
information theoretic sense. That is, if the structures in
the brain that encode memory and personality have
been so disrupted that it is no longer possible in
principle to restore them to an appropriate functional
state then the person is dead. If the structures that
encode memory and personality are sufficiently intact
that inference of the memory and personality are
feasible in principle, and therefore restoration to an
appropriate functional state is likewise feasible in
principle, then the person is not dead.”541
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The utility of the information-theoretic criterion of death to
this case and this discussion is to point out that few if any
patients pronounced dead by today’s physicians are in fact
truly dead by any scientifically rigorous criteria. A further and
even more disturbing complication is the rapidly advancing
technology of organ cryopreservation [12]. Using ice-free
cryopreservation methods (vitrification), reversible long-term
function of the mammalian kidney has been achieved after
cooling to –135°C (Fahy GM: Vitrification as an approach to
cryopreservation [abstract]. Presented at the 42nd Meeting
of the Society for Cryobiology, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
USA, July 24-27, 2005). Using essentially the same
techniques, investigators have been able to achieve
indefinite cryopreservation of the mammalian brain with
intact ultrastructure and substantial preservation of
metabolic and electrophysiological activity [13]. Long-term
reversible cryopreservation of the mammalian brain would, in
effect, enable most of today’s terminally ill or even ‘DCD’
patients to engage in speculative medical time travel in
pursuit of a cure [14], further complicating the issue of when
death is.
But speculative science not withstanding, we must return to
the conundrum of when and how to pronounce death in the
case at hand, and others even more vexing, where there is an
unarguably uninjured and intact brain at the time medicolegal
death is pronounced. Real-world examples are conscious and
competent patients on ventilator, left ventricular assist device
(LVAD) support, or other kinds of life support who wish for
the withdrawal of treatment and subsequent donation of vital
organs [15]. Rigorously defined, death is a slow process and
can only be assured when autolysis of the brain is far
advanced or completed. Both the stability of brain
ultrastructure and the recovery of viable neurons after hours
of cardiac arrest are well documented [16]. Clearly, such a
lengthily post-arrest interval for declaring medicolegal death
is neither practical nor humane.
Both medicine and the law should respond to this problem
with common sense, compassion and flexibility. It is only the
ideologue or the fool who acknowledges noon and midnight,
but denies all the states of light and darkness that smoothly
shade together in the real world to create day and night.
Patients who are not candidates for further medical
intervention to save or prolong their lives should be
pronounced dead based not on the absolute or theoretical
irreversibility of their pathology, but rather on the basis of the
permanence of this condition; namely, that there will be no
attempt to resuscitate, revive, or otherwise seek to continue
the patient’s life. In the current milieu, this means the use of
whatever clinical criteria under the law are appropriate at a
time when further therapeutic interventions are medically
ineffective, or are rejected by the patient, or his duly
authorized medical surrogate.
Streat summarizes the course physicians should follow
succinctly:
“My own concerns in non-heart-beating organ
donation are for the medical acceptability of the
methods used to certify death, the independence of
this process from the organ retrieval process, the
manner in which the option of organ donation is
discussed with the family and the acceptability of all of
these processes to everyone involved. I do not believe
that organ donation should ever be ‘recommended’ to
families, only that under appropriate clinical
circumstances, perhaps including this one, it is an
‘option’ that should be ‘sensitively offered’.”
As Streat notes above, the critical factors are informed
consent, lack of advocacy or conflict of interest in the organ
retrieval process, and a medical determination of the
permanence of the condition (i.e., inappropriateness of further
life prolonging efforts).
The issue of auto-resuscitation, which is so problematic to
Whetstine, should be considered in the context of a simple,
real-world test. If a patient who terminates LVAD or ventilator
support is duly and legally pronounced dead at the time of
cardiorespiratory arrest, would it be homicide to fire a bullet
into his brain one minute later? The contemporary medical
and legal answer is clearly ‘no’. Thus, the administration of
appropriate drugs to prevent medically contraindicated auto-
resuscitation in the context of a modality that would not
otherwise be applied to the dead patient without his consent
is morally and legally permissible, as well as being a great
humanitarian good. Post-pronouncement administration of a
cardioplegic dose of potassium chloride, in addition to an
electrocortically suppressive dose of barbiturate or diprivan,
to prevent ROSC and possible recovery of some degree of
consciousness during post-pronouncement CPR, extra-
corporeal support, or rapid in situ blood washout with organ
preservation solution, would seem not merely desirable, but
an ethically mandated part of the standard of care. You
cannot kill a patient who is already medicolegally dead.
Defining death in morally absolute terms is technologically, if
not scientifically, impossible at this time. Attempts to use rigid,
binary, black or white, all or none approaches will only serve to
recreate the bitter futility of similarly barren arguments that
have characterized the debate over when life begins (and the
attendant social and medical issue of abortion). In the real
world, death is a continuum, and it should be dealt with as
such. That means thoughtful judgment on the part of patients,
physicians and lawmakers as to where to draw lines in that
shifting sand. If the informed consent of the patient is the
foremost value, there will be little moral risk in deciding just
how dark it must be before night has fallen.542
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The rules for the interpretation of death by whole brain death
(WBD) criteria were formulated over 20 years ago in an age
of only moderate technological innovation. In 2005, it may be
that modern critical care medicine has modified the entire
concept of WBD, mandating replacement by a new paradigm
taking into account our ability to discern shades of grey in
brain function. Those shades of grey have become the focus
of much debate as we try to find the line separating ‘alive
enough to donate’ and ‘dead enough to bury’.
These paradigm shifts not withstanding, the rules set out for
the determination of death as it pertains to organ donation
are very clear even in 2005. Patients must be dead before
organs can be taken for transplantation. Traditionally, ‘brain
death’ has been necessary for a patient to be declared legally
dead for procurement of organs for transplantation [3]. The
concept of DCD is a creative interpretation of the DDR [17],
equating the aftermath of cardiac death with the presence of
brain death. Many more patients could be used for donorship
using cardiac death criteria.
But these concepts are not synonymous. Brain death is a
diagnosis that death has occurred. Cardiac death is a
prognosis that death is inevitable (using WBD criteria). The
rules set down by the UDDA [1] suggest that death must be
irreversible. Patients with cardiac standstill may not necessarily
be brain dead, and may actually be resuscitatable if anyone
chose to do it [18]. The criteria to make that determination
must be both necessary and sufficient for death. It is necessary
and sufficient that the entire brain has irreversibly ceased to
function. Loss of a heartbeat is sufficient but not necessary in
the presence of WBD. In this regard, DCD is a very creative
interpretation of the DDR using utilitarian criteria. Patients may
not be necessarily ‘dead’ by the rules, but they’re ‘dead
enough’ after cardiac standstill if death is inevitable. A
seemingly small issue, but with big picture implications.
The big picture of all workarounds and creative interpretation of
the rules is more daunting than the short-term benefits. The
rules for organ donation are poorly amenable to bending, lest
we find ourselves bidding for organs on eBay [19] or
harvesting suspicious operating room deaths as in Coma [20].
Enthusiasm and aggressive marketing techniques to raise
public consciousness about organ donation are not necessarily
compatible with rules in place to protect public rights.
Now that this workaround has been popularized, further
creative interpretations of the rules are inevitable. Anything
that increases the desired supply of organs could be fair
game. Why not allow families to simply authorize mining for
paired organs from incompetent relatives before death, and
then withdraw life support on the basis of futility? Further,
why not mandate that everyone is a donor unless they sign up
with an ‘I don’t want to donate’ registry? Now that the foot is
in the door, and not much cry of foul has been forthcoming,
more workarounds are on the way and each one will be an
escalation of creative interpretation slanted toward increasing
demand, perhaps at the cost of individual rights. This is the
major reason why a very public discourse must continue on
the subject of how we interpret the rules for organ donation.
DCD: a work-around of the rules we need to consider carefully
David Crippen
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